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According to the rational expectations hypothesis (REH), current long-term 
interest rate equals the average of the current and expected short-term rates.   For 
example, the yield on the three-month T-Bill (TB3) is determined as the average of the 
current one-month rate and the expected one-month rates over the next two months.  
Hence,  changes in TB3 should be proportional to changes in the expectations of 
monthly rates over the course of the next two months.  Kuttner (2001) underlines this 
point and notes that Treasury rates change in anticipation of changes in the federal 
funds rate target.  Consequently, on the day of a target change, changes in Treasury 
rates should only reflect unanticipated changes in the target.  To test this argument, he 
regresses changes in Tresury rates onto expected and unexpected target changes.  He 
finds that the coefficient estimate for unanticipated changes is significantly greater 
than that for anticipated changes,  however it is significanly less than one.  Kuttner 
notes that these findings are consistent with the REH.  Changes in Treasury rates on 
the day of a target change reflect changes in the average expected overnight rates over 
the duration of the contract.  Hence, the impact of a one-day surprise is expected to be 
less than one-for-one.   Furthermore, many one-day policy surprises have to do with 
the timing of actions rather than with their ultimate size (see Demiralp and Jorda, 
2004).  The advancement or postponement of anticipated rate changes have smaller 
effects than actions that affect expectations of future rates.   
Kuttner’s explanation of his findings is that changes in overnight interest rate 
affect term rates only to the extent that they lead to revisions in expectations of future 
overnight rates.  Kuttner does not test this argument but only offers it as an 
explanation for his findings.  In this paper, we offer a formal investigation of this 
argument by estimating the revisions in expectations of future overnight rates over the 
  1course of a three-month Treasury Bill rate.  Our findings are highly consistent with 
the expectations theory and along the lines discussed by Kuttner.  Specifically, 
changes in TB3 closely follow revisions in expected overnight rates over the next 90 
days.  After 1996, this relationship is not significanlty different from one.   
II.  Measuring Revisions in the Policy Path 
 
In order to test the REH, we need to measure revisions in the policy path not 
only for the current month, but also over the duration of a financial contract.  The 
contract that we consider is the TB3.  Kuttner’s methodology allows us to estimate 
revisions in the policy path for the current month, following a target change.  In order 
to estimate revisions in the policy path three months into the future, we need to assess 
how the target change on day t affects policy expectations for the following two 
months.  We assume that the market expects a policy change only on regularly 
scheduled FOMC meetings and dismiss inter-meeting changes.
2 This assumption is 
reasonable for the post-1994 period that we consider, since there are only 5 target 
changes (out of 50) that took place on non-FOMC days.  We also assume that the 
market expects the average overnight rate for a given month to be equal to the funds 
rate target.  This assumption is also strongly supported by the data as daily deviations 
from the target are only temporary (see Carpenter and Demiralp, 2006).   
Consider the FOMC calendar illustrated in Figure 1.  FOMC meetings are 
typically scheduled four to six weeks apart.  If there is an FOMC meeting in month 
one, two possibilities exist for the next month: there may be no FOMC meeting (2a), 
or there may be an FOMC meeting (2b).  If there is no FOMC meeting in month two, 
then, there has to be an FOMC meeting in the following month (3a).  Alternatively, if 
                                                 
2 As it will be explained shortly, the identification procedure depends on the formation of expectations 
around the FOMC calendar.  Therefore, we also exclude those observations where there was an 
intermeeting move prior to an FOMC meeting in the same month because these  intermeeting changes 
would disrupt the procedure that extracts market surprises based on regular meetings.  
  2there was an FOMC meeting in month two, then, there may not (3b) or may be (3c) a 
meeting in the following month. 
Our methodology consists of estimating the market surprise regarding the 
FOMC decision at each node.  In particular, we are interested in how the target 
change in the current month affects policy expectations in the second and third 
months.  The market surprise for the current month  is calculated following Kuttner 
(2001), using the federal funds futures contracts for the spot month (FF1) and one-
month forward (FF2).  The surprises for months two and three are calculated using 
fed funds futures contracts for two-month (FF3) and three month (FF4) forward as 
described next. 
 
2.a.  No FOMC Meeting in Month 2 
If there is no FOMC meeting in the second month, then, the policy surprise in 
that month is the same as the market surpise from the first month (Surprise m1), 
assuming that the term premium is unchanged between the first and the second 
months.  Sack (2004) notes that constant term premium at the short end of the yield 
curve is supported empirically.   
 
2.b.  FOMC meeting on day k of Month 2 
If there is an FOMC meeting on day k of the next month, then one-month 
futures contract as of day t-1 (in the current month) is equal to: 
2
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  3where  is the funds rate target as of day t in month one,   is the funds rate target as 
of day k in month two, 
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E  is the expectations operator, and   is the number of days 
in month two.   
2 m
Taking the difference between the price of the one-month contract between 
days t and t-1: 
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Solving for the second term on the right hand side: 
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(2) 
The term on the left hand side in equation (2) gives the market surprise for the 
second month (Surprise m2) which is related to the surprise from the first month.  The 
intuition is rather simple: total change in one-month forward rate on day t consists of 
two parts: revisions in expectations for overnight rates that are expected to prevail 
until day k of next month (which is the market surprise for the current target change), 
and revisions in expectations for overnight rates that are expected to prevail after day 
k next month (Surprise m2).  Hence, we can identify the remainder of the market 
surprise for the next month by subtracting current month’s suprise from the total 
revision.   
Equation (2) is used to obtain the market surpise for most days of the month 
except for:  
i.  If a target change occurs in the last three days of the next month, the 
difference in the two-month forward rate is used to derive the policy 
surprise since it reflects the expected average funds rate for the 
following month: 
  44 43 4 42 1
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ii.  If the target change takes place on the first day of the current month, 
we use the two-month forward rate from the previous  month to 
assess market’s expectations on day 1.     
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   3.a.  FOMC meeting on day j 
Market surprise is calculated analogous to 2.b., but this time utilizing the two-
month forward contract (as opposed to one-month).  In the special cases where target 
change takes place on the last days or on the first day of the following month, 
adjustments anologous to 2.b.  are made, this time using FF4. 
 
3.b.  No FOMC meeting  
If there is no FOMC meeting in the third month, then, the policy surprise in 
that month is the same as the surpise from the second month (as derived under 2.b.). 
 
3.c.  FOMC meeting on day p 
Market surprise in this case is calculated analogous to 3.a.  The only 
difference is that the total revision in FF3 consists of the surprises from the first and 
the third months in 3.a. whereas it consists of the surprises from the second and the 
third months in 3.c.  
Using this methodology, we compute revisions in the policy path three months 
into the future (not shown).  Path revisons in the second and the third months are 
  5usually in the same direction as the surprise in the current month and they are of 
similar magnitudes.  The uniformity of futures rates’ responses to surprise target 
changes in the current month is also highlighted by Kuttner (2001).  Our results 
support this argument. 
III.  Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we compute path revisions in the next 90 days after a target 
change to analyze whether changes in the three month T-Bill are proportional to these 
revisions consistent with the REH.  If the REH holds, then there should be a one-to-
one relationship between changes in the T-Bill rate and changes in path revisions over 
the duration of the contract.   
Table 1 reports the results from the regression where changes in TB3 are 
regressed onto changes in path revisions for the post-1994 sample of FOMC days with 
target changes.  The equation is estimated for different starting points for each year 
after 1994.  Column 2 reports the coefficient estimates associated with the revisions 
variable.  Column 3 reports the p-value from the hypothesis that tests whether this 
estimate is significantly different from one.  Post-1996 samples (rows 3-7) provide  
strong support for the REH where the coefficient estimate for the revisions variable is 
not significantly different from one.
3  Furthermore, high 
2 R values (column 4) reflect 
the strong explanatory power of the revisions variable, reinforcing our identification 
methodology.   
Columns 5-7 report the results for the specification where two-day changes in 
TB3 are regressed onto path revisions to incorporate any lagged response of T-Bill 
rates.  Once again, the REH is strongly supported, although 
2 R  statistics are 
                                                 
3 Notice that our identification relies on the market’s expectations of a target change on regularly 
scheduled FOMC meetings.  While the assumption of target changes on FOMC days became an 
established pattern of policy making after February 1994, it may have taken the market time to adjust to 
the new practice.  Indeed, a decreasing likelihood of inter-meeting changes may account for the 
observed increase in the parameter estimates as well as the p-values over time.  
  6somewhat lower as expected, given that the variation in the dependent variable is now 
susceptible to non-policy related changes over a longer time period.  When the 
analysis is repeated for the days of FOMC meetings only (Table 2) we still find 
significant evidence of the REH although the power of the test is not as strong.   
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we present a methodology that allows us to test the REH from a 
new perspective using revisions in policy expectations.  Previous tests of the REH 
focused on the implication that if the expectations hypothesis holds, then the spread 
between current long and short rates should predict future changes in the short rate 
(see e.g.  Rudebusch, 1995,  and the references therein).  Our findings are consistent 
with Rudebush (1995).
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Figure 1: FOMC Calendar 
1.  FOMC in Month 1 
 
 
2.a.  No FOMC in Month 2                                     2.b.  FOMC in Month 2 
 
 
3.a.  FOMC in Month 3                             3.b.  No FOMC in Month 3             3.c.  FOMC in Month 3 
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Table 1: The Response of T-Bill to Path Revisons on FOMC Days with Target 
Changes 
 
   Dependent  variable 
   1 3 3 − − t t TB TB   1 1 3 3 − + − t t TB TB  
 Sample Period  1.    Sample 
Size 
2.  Coeff.  3.    p-
value 
4.
2 R   5.  Coeff.  6.    p-
value 
7.  
2 R  
1.  2/4/94-11/20/06  44  0.71 0.06  0.35  0.77 0.25 0.27 
2.  1/1/95-11/20/06  39  0.79 0.11  0.52  0.81 0.31 0.34 
3.  1/1/96-11/20/06  36  0.99 0.93  0.82  0.97 0.89 0.46 
4.  1/1/97-11/20/06  35  0.98 0.85  0.82  0.97 0.88 0.45 
5.  1/1/98-11/20/06  34  0.98 0.78  0.82  0.97 0.89 0.45 
6.  1/1/99-11/20/06  32  0.95 0.56  0.81  1.08 0.70 0.51 
7.  1/1/00-11/20/06  29  0.97 0.74  0.84  1.10 0.65 0.51 
 
 
Table 2: The Response of T-Bill to Path Revisons on FOMC Days  
 
   Dependent  variable 
   1 3 3 − − t t TB TB   1 1 3 3 − + − t t TB TB  
Sample Period  1.  Sample 
Size 
2. Coeff.  3.  p-
value 
4.
2 R   5. Coeff.  6.  p-
value 
7. 
2 R  
1. 2/4/94-11/20/06  102  0.58 0.00 0.23  0.82 0.21 0.26 
2. 1/1/95-11/20/06  94  0.63 0.00 0.30  0.82 0.20 0.28 
3. 1/1/96-11/20/06  86  0.76 0.02 0.41  0.94 0.69 0.33 
4. 1/1/97-11/20/06  78  0.75 0.02 0.39  0.90 0.53 0.30 
5. 1/1/98-11/20/06  70  0.86 0.15 0.56  0.87 0.43 0.31 
6. 1/1/99-11/20/06  62  0.84 0.07 0.63  0.95 0.76 0.37 
7. 1/1/00-11/20/06  54  0.86 0.10 0.68  0.97 0.85 0.37 
 
p-values correspond to the null hypothesis  1 : 0 = β H  
 
Sample Period: 2/4/1994-11/20/2006 
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